Michigan Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 5

1946

TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-TRANSFER IN
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH-RELEASE OF A POWER TO AMEND
Milton D. Solomon S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons

Recommended Citation
Milton D. Solomon S.Ed., TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-TRANSFER IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATHRELEASE OF A POWER TO AMEND, 44 MICH. L. REV. 876 (1946).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol44/iss5/22

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ri°'AXATION-FEDERAL EsTATE TAX-TRANSFER IN CONTEMPLATION OF
DEATH-RELEASE OF A PowER TO AMEND-Decedent, an attorney, in 1925,
at the age of sixty-nine, established two spendthrift trusts-one for his daughter
and one for his son. In 1934, he added securities to these trusts. Gift taxes
were paid on these transfers. These gifts were made to support decedent's children and grandchildren and were intended to be free of all claims, tax or otherwise. Decedent retained a power to amend these trusts with the consent of the
trustee and beneficiary but he believed, at the time, that the trust property would
not be included in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. In 1937, he
was advised that these gifts remained a part of his gross estate for estate tax
purposes. He then renounced his power to amend the trusts. Decedent died
in 1938 at the age of eighty-two. The release of the power to amend the trusts
was treated by the commissioner as ground for including the corpus of the
trusts within decedent's gross estate on the theory that the release was a transfer made in contemplation of death under section 302 ( d) ( 1, 3) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as.amended by the Revenue Act of 1934, Section 401. The
tax was paid and the executors brought this suit for refund. The district court 1
gave judgment for the plaintiff and the court of appeals 2 affirmed. Held:
The release of the power to amend' the trusts, made for the purpose of avoiding
the estate tax, was not in "contemplation of death" so as to require inclusion of
the trust property in decedent's gross estate. Affirmed. Allen, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Trust Company of Georgia, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 389.
The phrase "in contemplation of death" has not been interpreted by the Supreme Court since 1938.8 Presumably guided by the Wells 4 case, lower tribunals have continued to deal with this problem and have held, more o~en than
not, against the government. 5 In United States v. Wells/' the leading case on
the construction of this phrase, it was held that if the dominant motive of the
donor in making the transfer was one associated with death rather than life, the
transfer was in contemplation of death. The motive of avoidance of estate taxes

1

55 F. Supp. 269 (1944).

(C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 120.
Colorado Nat~onal Bank v. Comm. 305 U.S. 23, 59 S. Ct. 48 (1938), noted
in 37 M1cH. L. REv. 338 (1938). City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323
U.S. 594, 6 5 S. Ct,. 496 ( l 945), was a contemplation of death- case but the facts
were so unusual that it is outside the scope of this note.
4 United States v. Wells, 28 3 U.S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446 ( 193 1).
5 For a scoreboard of cases won an:d lost by the government see Pavenstedt, "Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death: A Proposal For Abolition;' 54 YALE
L. J. 70 at 72 (1944).,
6 See note 4, supra.
2

8
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has been generally held to be one associated with death.7 The language of the
circuit court for the second circuit, in the Bowers 8 case, led the Treasury Department to attempt to extend the doctrine of the W ells9 case by amending its
regulations.10 Under the regulations 11 so aJ.?lended, the Treasury Depai:tment
contended that a transfer was. "in contemplation of death" if it could be said
that a death motive was a substantial part of the donor's motives in making the
transfer. In holding that the death motive need not be dominant but only substantial to warrant holding the transfer to be one "in contemplation of death,"
the court in the Bowers 12 case distinguished, in terms of social desirability, between the kind of life motives present in that case and those in the Wells 18
case. In amending the regulations, 1-1 the Treasury Department made no such
distinction b_etween kinds of life motives but provided that if the death motive
was substantial the gift was "in contemplation of death." The Supreme Court,
in the principal case,1 5 has rejected this attempted extension of the Wells 16
7 Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 794,
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 648, 59 S. Ct. 589 (1939). But see Denniston v. Comm.,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 925, where it was held that the motive to avoid
estate taxes is associated with death but th~t such motive, standing alone, will not
always suffice to support an ultimate finding of contemplation of death. For a list of
motives associated with life and those associated with death see I PAUL, FEDERAL
EsTATE AND G1FT TAXATION, §§ 6.07-6.15 (1942) and HUGHES, FEDERAL DEATH
TAX, § 76 (1938).
8 See note 7, supra.
9 See note 4, supra.
10 TREAS. REG. 80, art. 16 (1934), promulgated after the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446 (1931), stated
that, "if the transfer results from mixed motives one of which is the thought of death,
the more compelling motive controls." T.D. 4966, 1940 lNT. REv. BuL. 220,
amending TREAS. REG. 80 (1937). Art. 16 provided, "A transfer in contemplation
· of death is a disposition of property prompted by the thought of death ( though it need
not be solely prompted). A transfer is prompted by the thought of death if it is made
with the purpose of avoiding the tax, or as a substitute for a testamentary disposition
of property, or for any other motive associated with death." See Pavenstedt, "Transfers In Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition," 54 YALE L. J. 70 at 7 5
(1944).
11 See note 1o, supra.
12 See (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 794 at 924. The life motives in the
Bowers case were a desire to avoid payment of income taxes and a desire to avoid a
British capital levy; the death motive was a desire to avoid the payment of federal
estate taxes.
18 See note 4, supra. The life motive of the settler in the Wells case was to provide for his children.
14 See note Io, supra.
lG Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 389. It may be noted
that the court was unanimous in its decision.
No social stigma attached to the life motives of the decedent in the principal case.
He desired to provide for the economic well-being of his children and grandchildren;
that he did not want the corpus of these trusts to be included in his gross estate was
not sufficient to make the gifts "in contemplation of death" unless the triers of fact
found this to have been decedent's dominant motive.
16 See note 4, supra.
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case. At least, in cases where life motives are not tax avoidance, the substantial
motive test of the Bowers 17 case seems overruled though it may still apply when
the life motives of the donor impress the court as socially undesirable. In the
principal case,18 it -was found by both lower tribunals that the dominant and sole
motive leading to the decedent's release of his power to amend the trusts was
avoidance of the federal estate tax. Nevertheless, the court held the release not
to be "in contemplation of death." It took the position that the release should
not be looked upon as an isolated transaction but that it should be considered in
the light of the entire transaction and when so considered, the lower tribunal
was warranted in holding that the desire to avoid estate taxes was mixed with
th'e motive of caring for decedent's children and grandchildren and that the
latter was the impelling motive for the transfer.19 In other words, but for a mistake as to the legal effect of the trusts, when established, the decedent would not
have retained a power to amend; therefore, ·the decedent's rectification of his
mistake will not be made an occasion for holding the gift to be one "in contemplation of death." The difficulty the writer has in accepting this line of reasoning is that the court is dealing with a tax statute 20 and is not sitting-as a court of
equity in a case where a party is seeking reformation of a gift because of a mistake as to the legal effect of a trust instrument. The contemplation of death
considered by the statute 21 is the contemplation at the time of the release and
not twelve years before. If recourse must be made to motive to determine
whether a transfer was "in contemplation of death," it must have reference to
the motive at the time of the release of the power to amend and not the motive
at the time the trusts were originally established. This decision highlights, once
again, the gross inadequacy of the present statutory scheme in attacking evasions
of the estate tax by inter vivos transfers of elderly persons. Either the federal
estate and gift taxes should be integrated 22 or a conclusive presumption that gifts
made by persons of advanced age are "in contemplation of death" should be
23
enacted by Congress.
M·:1
uton D . Solo mon, S.Ed.
17 See note 7, supra. In principal case at 391 the Supreme Court cites the Bowers
case with approval. Hence, in the opinion of this writer, the Bowers case is still good
law when the life _motives of the donor are avoidance of income and capital taxes.
Query: What result if it is shown that the life motives of the donor combined with
a desire to avoid payment of estate taxes, were both desirable and undesirable from
a social viewpoint?
18
See note I 5, supra.
19
See 66 S. Ct. 389 at 392 (1945). At the same time, the court accepted the
government's contention that if the release of the power to amend the trust had been
an independent transaction with the sole motive ?f avoidance of the estate tax, the
release would have been in contemplation of death. Therefore it seems to this writer
that the Supreme Court has rejected the reasoning of Denniston v. Comm., (C.C.A.
3d, 1939) io6_F. (2d) 925.
20 Sec. 302(d) (1) and (3) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as amended by § 401
of the Revenue Act of 1934. Now found in Internal Revenue Code, § 8u(d) (1)
and (4).
·
21 See note 20, supra.
22 See "Altman," Integration of Estate and Gift Taxes," 7 L. AND CoNTEM.
PROB, 33 I (1940).
23 Though the Supreme Court in Heiner v. Donnan, 2 8 5 U.S. 3 1 2, 5 2 S. Ct.
358 (1932), overruled one effort by Congress to establish a conclusive presumption on
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this point, the present court would be likely to hold such a conclusive presumption
constitutional. See Lowndes, "The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1938
Term," 88 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 1 at 32 (1939). For a recommendation of a more
restricted presumption than that declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court see
I PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 6.26 (1942). In support of an
"economic test" of taxability see Harris, "Gifts in Contemplation of Death," 19
TAXES 151 (1941). Pavenstedt also advocates a conclusive presumption in his article,
"Taxation of Transfers In Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition," 54 YALE
L.]. 70 at 90 (1944).

